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Introduction
In our global world, large volumes of food products cross state borders every day.
The food we eat and the ingredients it is made of originate from different places
in the world: beef may come from Argentina, haricots verts from Kenya or Sene-
gal, wheat from France, palm oil from Malaysia and mango and pineapple from
Thailand. This article is about the transnational regulation of food safety, that is,
the regulation of food safety beyond nation state borders.
Sound regulations for controlling the safe production, processing, transport and
consumption of these food products are important. Nobody wants to become ill
from the consumption of food products, as recently happened to almost
3,000 consumers in Germany and 15 other countries1 due to the consumption of,
it is believed, bean sprouts infected with the Enterohemorrhagic E. coli bacte-
rium, better known as EHEC.2
Food safety regulations cannot prevent all incidents, as the EHEC outbreak dem-
onstrates, but the assumption is that without such regulations many more inci-
dents would happen, for example, because farmers from different countries have
different understandings of what food safety is or how it should be achieved.
Food safety is regulated by both public and private actors through many different
transnational regulations, such as the Codex Alimentarius and the General Food
1 On 20 June 2011, Germany’s national disease control centre, the Robert Koch Institute, reported
2,773 infected people, of whom twelve had died. Another 814 people had been infected with the
life-threatening disease HUS (haemolytic uraemic syndrome) which is a severe complication of
the EHEC infection. HUS had resulted in 27 fatalities to date. Five days earlier, the World Health
Organization reported 109 EHEC and HUS cases in fifteen other countries. (http://www.rki.de/
cln_109/nn_217400/DE/Home/Info-HUS.html, 21-6-2011, http://www.euro.who.int/en/what-
we-do/health-topics/emergencies/international-health-regulations/news/news/2011/06/ehec-
outbreak-update-18, 20-6-2011).
2 According to the World Health Organization (WHO) ‘Enterohaemorrhagic E. coli (EHEC) is a
harmful strain of the E.coli bacterium that can cause severe foodborne disease. It is transmitted
to humans primarily through consumption of contaminated foods, such as raw or undercooked
ground meat products and raw milk. The infection may lead to a life-threatening disease, such as
haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS). ... The prevention of infection requires control measures at
all stages of the food chain, from agricultural production on the farm to processing, manufactur-
ing and preparation of foods in both commercial establishments and the domestic environ-
ment. ... The only effective method of eliminating EHEC from foods is to introduce a bactericidal
treatment, such as heating (e.g., cooking or pasteurisation) or irradiation.’ For more information
about EHEC see: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs125/en/.
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Law (EG 178/2002).3 Recently, several different transnational supermarket stan-
dards have emerged. These are standards developed by supermarkets to guaran-
tee food safety and quality on farms around the world. The label transnational
indicates that they apply to suppliers beyond, across and within national bounda-
ries.4
Examples of such supermarket standards include Tesco Nature’s Choice, which
was introduced in 1991 by the British retailer Tesco; BRC Global Standard for
Food Safety, which was introduced in 1998 by British retailers united in the Brit-
ish Retail Consortium; and GlobalGAP (Global Partnership for Good Agricultural
Practices), which was introduced in 2001 by a group of supermarkets in West
European countries. These standards still exist, albeit they have been reviewed
and modified several times in the course of time. More than 100,000 food compa-
nies throughout the world have implemented one or more of these standards.
The emergence of transnational supermarket standards gives rise to interesting
theoretical and empirical questions about the development, legitimacy and effec-
tiveness of these standards. Why have transnational supermarket standards
emerged to certify food safety performance of farms? How is food safety protec-
ted in transnational supermarket standards? What does it mean for local farmers
when they have to comply with transnational standards? This article focuses on
the first question. It explores the emergence and evolution of transnational
supermarket standards by analyzing the development of GlobalGAP, one of the
most commonly implemented supermarket standards on farms throughout the
world.5 In the literature, the emergence of transnational regulation is often
attributed to one or two factors that played a role at a particular moment in time.
3 The Codex Alimentarius (1963) is a collection of transnational standards, codes of practice,
guidelines and other recommendations for food products. The main purposes of the Codex Ali-
mentarius are protecting the health of consumers and ensuring fair practices in the food trade.
(www.codexalimentarius.nl). See ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/understanding/Under
standing_EN.pdf
The General Food Law includes general principles and requirements regulating food in general
and food safety in particular. It lays down the responsibilities of food companies in food chains
to guarantee food safety, including the obligation to establish systems and procedures for tracea-
bility purposes.
See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:031:0001:0024:EN:PDF.
4 Transnational regulatory regimes resemble international or global regimes. According to Mei-
dinger (2009), the core difference is that the label transnational suggests that states are only one
type of actor among others. Regulatory functions are increasingly distributed among a wide array
of actors, including government bodies, businesses, trade associations, professional organisa-
tions and non-governmental organisations. Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2009) see another
main difference between the labels transnational and global. They say that transnational implies
vagueness and blurred boundaries to a degree the label global could not. That label suggests activ-
ities taking place all over the world. This generalising term is therefore less suitable for indicating
regimes that regulate activities cross national boundaries, but which do not extend across the
entire world.
5 In October 2010, more than 102,000 farmers and growers in more than one hundred countries
had their farms certified under GlobalGAP: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/upload/Resources/
Publications/Flyer/100920_D-FactsFigures-low.pdf, 12-11-2010.
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The main argument made in this article is that the emergence of transnational
supermarket standards is best understood when it is studied as a process.
The argument is constructed as follows. First, in Section 2, the most relevant
characteristics of transnational supermarket standards are explained by compar-
ing them with other private food standards. The results are then presented of a
literature study on factors that contribute to the emergence of transnational (pri-
vate) regulation. The eight factors found in the literature are discussed in Sec-
tions 3 and 4. The following two sections describe the development of GlobalGAP:
Section 5 focuses on the reasons why GlobalGAP has emerged while Section 6
explains how GlobalGAP has evolved in the course of time. The article concludes
in Section 7 by explaining why the emergence of transnational supermarket stan-
dards is best understood when it is studied as a process.
Transnational Standards
There are many definitions of what a standard is. In general terms, a standard is a
set of rules to guide and judge behaviour in a uniform way.6 They transmit infor-
mation to customers and end-users about a product’s technical specifications, its
compliance with safety criteria or the processes by which it has been produced
and sourced.7
Transnational standards developed by supermarkets have been studied exten-
sively by Henson and Humphrey. In an article prepared for the International
Workshop on Globalisation, Global Governance and Private Standards, held in
Leuven (Belgium) in 2008, they argue the importance of acknowledging the dif-
ferences between standards.8 According to these authors, transnational standards
created by supermarkets are often ‘thrown into the same (often negative) basket’
with public regulation and other private standards without appreciating their dis-
tinctions. The negative image of private standards would have been influenced by
a lack of clarity about the impact of these standards.
Henson and Humphrey distinguish four categories of standards, as shown in
Table 1:
Table 1 Categories of standards
Government Non-governmental actor
Mandatory Regulations Legally-mandated non-governmental standards
Voluntary Governmental voluntary standards Voluntary non-governmental standards
Source: Henson & Humphrey 2008
Transnational supermarket standards are represented in the far-right column
below: they are designed by private actors, in this particular case by supermar-
6 Abbott & Snidal 2001, p.345.
7 Nadvi 2008, p.325.
8 Main parts of this paper have been published in an article in: Journal of Development Studies
2010 46 (9), p.1628-1646.
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kets, and they are voluntary in the sense that there is no legal compulsion on
compliance. These standards can become mandatory in a commercial sense when
compliance is a requirement to gain access to certain markets.
The position of a particular standard may change over time. It is not uncommon
for standards to migrate between cells. Henson and Humphrey state:
For example, the Safe Quality Food series of standards was originally devel-
oped by the government of Western Australia, which can be categorised as a
governmental voluntary standard, but they were subsequently acquired by
the Food marketing Institute (an industry organisation representing the US
food retail and wholesale sectors), implying reclassification as a non-govern-
mental voluntary standard.9
Standards may also change in character. As the analysis below indicates, Global-
GAP has developed from a voluntary standard into a commercial, mandatory
standard, at least from the standpoint of suppliers. Farmers have to have their
farms GlobalGAP certified because supermarkets and other food companies in the
supply chain want to see a certificate before doing business.
The distinction between public and private standards is less clear than Table 1
suggests. The difference between these standards is blurred by the various regula-
tory roles associated with standards: standard-setting, monitoring compliance
and enforcement.10 Public and private actors can perform each of these roles,
alone and together. Many forms of transnational regulation are characterised by a
mix of public and private organisations involved in these regulatory roles. This
means that a middle category of standards can be distinguished: standards where
the regulatory roles are performed by a mix of public and private actors. The stan-
dard analysed in this article is a truly private standard as it is set by supermarkets
and monitored and enforced by external certification companies.
Transnational Supermarket Standards
Transnational supermarket standards have in common that they are designed by
supermarkets in order to be adopted and implemented by their suppliers
throughout the world. They vary, however, in the form they take, who imple-
ments them, and the issues they address.11 Popular transnational supermarket
standards are Tesco Nature’s Choice, GlobalGAP (both apply to primary produc-
tion processes), BRC Global Standard for Food Safety, and IFS Food (these two
apply to the processing of food) (Table 2).
Transnational supermarket standards can take two forms: individual company
standards and collective standards. Individual company standards are set by indi-
vidual supermarkets, mainly large ones. Examples of such standards are Tesco
Nature’s Choice and the Albert Heijn Protocol, which was introduced in 2009.
9 Henson & Humphrey 2008, p.3.
10 Henson & Humphrey 2008.
11 Henson & Humphrey 2008.
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Transnational supermarket standards can also be developed by coalitions of
supermarkets, which may consist of supermarkets from the same country, such as
the British Retail Consortium, or supermarkets from different countries, such as
GlobalGAP.
Transnational supermarket standards are designed to be implemented by super-
market suppliers in different countries. These suppliers are the companies that
sell food products directly to supermarkets and those companies upstream in the
supply chain that produce, process and distribute food products. Many transna-
tional supermarket standards focus either on the production or the processing
stage in the supply chain. GlobalGAP and Tesco Nature’s Choice, for example,
Table 2 Characteristics of four popular transnational supermarket standards
Tesco Nature’s
Choice
GlobalGAP BRC Global Stan-
dard for Food
Safety
IFS Food
Standard
owner
Tesco FoodPLUS British Retail Con-
sortium
IFS (International
Featured Stan-
dards)
Year of
introduc-
tion
1991 2001 1998 2002
Form Individual company
standard
Collective standard Collective standard Collective stan-
dard
Scope Primary produc-
tion: fruits and veg-
etables
Primary production:
crops, livestock,
aquaculture
Processing, handling,
packaging of food
products
Processing, han-
dling, packaging of
food products
Issues - Food safety
- Workers
health, safety
and welfare
- Environmental
protection1
- Food safety
- Workers
health, safety
and welfare
- Environmental
protection
- Animal welfare
- Food safety
- Workers
health, safety
and welfare
- Environmental
protection2
- Food safety
- Workers
health, safety
and welfare3
Number
of certi-
fied sup-
pliers /
countries
15,000 / 70 (2009)4 102,300 / 108 (Oct
2010)5
13,067 / 104 (Nov
2010)6
12,000 / 90 (Feb
2010)7
Sources: see footnotes
1 http://www.tescofarming.com/tnc.asp, 17-11-2010.
2 BRC, Overview and Contents of BRC Global Standard for Food Safety Issue 5.
3 http://www.ifs-certification.com/index.php?page=home&content=public_content&desc=
ifs_standards_food_5&language=english, 18-11-2010.
4 http://www.investis.com/plc/storage/tesco_cr_09.pdf, 18-11-2010.
5 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/upload/Resources/Publications/Flyer/100920_D-FactsFigures-
low.pdf, 17-11-2010.
6 http://www.brcdirectory.com/, 17-11-2010.
7 http://www.ifs-certification.com/download_public.php?ifs_testi_engl_okt2010_WEB.pdf,
18-11-2010.
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apply to primary producers12 – farmers, growers, fishermen – while BRC Global
Standard for Food Safety and the IFS Food standard apply to companies that pro-
cess, handle or pack food products.13
Transnational supermarket standards also vary in the issues they address. The
first transnational supermarket standards addressed food safety issues. Many of
them now also encompass requirements on environmental protection and labour
conditions; some include requirements to do with animal welfare.
Factors Contributing to the Emergence of Transnational (Private) Regulation
Transnational regulation can be defined as the regional or global diffusion of
norms and standards.14 It suggests regulatory regimes that reach or operate
beyond nation-state borders, trying to regulate border-crossing activities or rela-
tions.
In the literature on transnational regulation, several explanations can be identi-
fied for why this specific form of regulation has emerged.15 Two observations can
be made on the literature. First, the factors contributing to the emergence of
transnational regulation are rather widely dispersed in the literature. Many
authors mention one or two factors. The different factors have not been studied
in relation to each other. In this article, eight different explanations identified in
that literature are brought together to try to analyse the emergence of transna-
tional regulation in a more integrated approach. Secondly, in explaining the emer-
gence of transnational regulation, many authors tend to focus on one moment in
time, while a more historical approach may give a more complete explanation for
why transnational regulations emerge.16 This article therefore tries to analyse the
emergence of GlobalGAP as a process. The eight different explanations found in
the literature are presented below.
A frequently identified explanation refers to weaknesses of nation-states as regula-
tors of cross-border issues.17 Individual states have difficulties regulating issues
that reach beyond nation state borders, such as environmental pollution or
markets that operate across state borders, because these issues fall under the
jurisdiction of more than one country. Also, when nation-states try to regulate
12 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=2, 17-11-2010, http://www.tescofar
ming.com/tnc.asp, 17-11-2010.
13 http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/standards/food/what-does-it-cover/, 17-11-2010, http://
www.ifs-certification.com/index.php?SID=1f0ddcf58009b5d1d7d782d6e156007c&page=home
&content=public_content&desc=ifs_standards, 17-11-2010.
14 This definition has been inspired by the definition Veerle Heyvaert (2010) gives to, what she
calls, ‘rules globalization’, that is ‘the regional or global diffusion of normative frameworks’.
15 Abbott & Snidal 2009; Bartley 2003; Bartley 2007; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000; Cafaggi 2011;
Caswell & Bach 2007; Diller 1999; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Fransen 2011; Glasbergen
2008; Heyvaert 2010; Meidinger 2009; Spar 1998; Vorley et al. 2007.
16 Van der Kloet & Havinga 2008.
17 Abbott & Snidal 2009; Cafaggi 2011; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Meidinger 2009.
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transnational issues together, it has proved difficult to achieve regulations; even
where they exist, they are rarely uniformly implemented.18
Many of the transnational issues that demand transnational regulation are some-
how related to public scares or other perceived risks.19 Scandals such as the EHEC
outbreak, the nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011 and the oil debacle in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 generate commotion and distrust and a demand for more (trans-
national) regulation and closer monitoring.20 This was also the case after a num-
ber of food safety incidents21 in the 1990s. These incidents contributed to a
decline in consumer confidence in the safety and quality of food22 and in the
capacity of regulators to guarantee food safety.23 Governments responded to the
alleged decline in consumer confidence with stricter regulations.
The emergence of transnational regulation may in itself encourage the emergence of
more transnational regulations, especially when the monitoring and auditing
activities are associated with a decline in trust.24 As audits reveal failures in com-
pliance they may, rather than building trust, generate distrust, leading to
demands for more regulation.
Transnational regulation may also emerge out of the need to harmonise existing
regulations. This need may be a response to fragmented national regulation (too
many separate regulations, regulating different aspects of a single issue) or may
arise from an increase in the number of private regulations regulating the same
issue.25 Harmonisation may also be encouraged to reduce costs.
Regulating distributional effects of existing transnational regulations can be
another reason for developing transnational regulations. Distributional effects,
like the costs of regulation and its impact, cannot be regulated by public and pri-
vate actors from one country.26 Costs of rule-making, monitoring and enforce-
ment transfer from nation-states to private actors and between Western devel-
oped states and developing states. Another effect related to the development of
transnational regulation is a reallocation of regulatory powers, which is likely to
favour developed states over developing states and large-scale companies over
small ones.27 New transnational regulations may emerge to protect the interests
of small-scale firms in developing countries.
Ambition and strategic interests are also reasons why regulators develop transna-
tional standards. At least this is why Veerle Heyvaert thinks the European Union
has developed REACH (EC 1907/2006), ‘a world standard for chemicals manage-
18 Cafaggi (2011) suggests that ‘failure to reach political consensus over treaty-based solutions has
triggered’ the development of transnational private forestry certification systems.
19 Meidinger 2009.
20 Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006.
21 Such as mad cow disease, hormones in beef, salmonella in eggs, dioxin in animal feed and pesti-
cide residues in fruit and vegetables.
22 FAO 2006.
23 Jaffee & Masakure 2005.
24 Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006.
25 Cafaggi 2011.
26 Cafaggi 2011.
27 Cafaggi 2011.
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ment’.28 The European Union believed it was able to develop a global standard
and was powerfully motivated to do so because of two main interests: to protect
the EU’s chemicals industry by imposing the same requirements on competitive
non-European chemical industries, and secondly, to increase its global influ-
ence.29
Two Other Explanations
Whereas some of the explanations mentioned above tend to locate the emergence
of transnational regulation in the individual interests of public and private actors,
other explanations relate the emergence of transnational regulation to collective
interests. The literature on the emergence of transnational private regulation
identifies two such explanations.30
These explanations suggest that companies develop standards either to solve col-
lective action problems in their markets or because the standards are the outcome
of strategic negotiations among companies, states, NGOs and social movements
about the regulation of transnational problems in markets and societies.31 Tim
Bartley, who studied the emergence of transnational private regulations in the
area of forest products and clothing, calls these two ways of explaining the emer-
gence of transnational private standards the ‘market-based approach’ and the
‘political-institutional approach’ (Table 3).
The market-based approach emphasises the role of market actors in constructing
standards. This explanation suggest that incentives, risks and uncertainties in the
market – such as consumer concerns about product safety and working condi-
tions – create collective dilemmas related to reputation, information and competi-
tion. Due to sharper media scrutiny and increased communication facilitated by
the Internet, much more is known about where our food products come from and
the conditions under which they are produced.
In competitive markets it is unlikely, says Bartley, that one single company will
tie itself down with stricter rules or costs for better inspections as this company
fears it would be more expensive than competitors, with a consequent loss of
market share. This is even more the case when the reputations of individual com-
panies are interdependent. In such situations, some companies will attempt to
ride for free on the efforts of others to improve the industry’s reputation. This
‘free rider’ problem can be solved through collective action. If all supermarkets
– or at least a good majority of the larger ones – follow the same standards, none
28 Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals. See:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/reach/index_en.htm.
29 Heyvaert 2010.
30 Bartley 2007; Caswell & Bach 2007; Diller 1999; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000; Fransen 2011; Glas-
bergen 2008; Meidinger 2009; Spar 1998; Vorley et al. 2007.
31 The first type of reasoning is discussed in Bartley 2007; Caswell & Bach 2007; Glasbergen 2008;
Spar 1998; Vorley et al. 2007. The second one in Bartley 2003; Bartley 2007; Braithwaite & Dra-
hos 2000; Henson & Caswell 1999; Henson & Humphrey 2008, 2010; Kerwer 2005.
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is individually punished.32 Even better, following the same standards enables
those companies to share costs and collect credible information about how prod-
ucts are made. It also enables them to distinguish themselves from the ‘bad guys’
and to source their products from a larger pool of ‘responsible’ farmers.
The political-institutional approach goes beyond the argument that standards are
developed by companies in response to external pressures. This explanation
treats standards as the outcome or resolution of conflicts among different groups
with unequal power and different demands and interests. The key players – com-
panies, states, NGOs and social movements – disagree on how transnational
problems in markets and societies should be regulated. They bargain and negoti-
ate about the best manner of regulation. These negotiations are shaped by the
power, facilities and strategies available to the different actors. The outcome may
not be an optimum solution for any group of actors because companies prefer
weaker commitments with minimum enforcement, while NGOs and social move-
ments prefer stronger, binding standards.33
Both types of explanation are suitable to explain the emergence of transnational
supermarket standards. They both suggest the involvement of private actors in
rulemaking and recognise the capacity and willingness of those actors to solve
problems in markets and society. Following the first type of explanation, transna-
tional supermarket standards may have emerged from coalitions of supermarkets
because they had collective problems which they wanted to resolve. According to
the second type of explanation, the emergence of transnational supermarket
standards can be considered the outcome of negotiations among governments,
32 Spar 1998.
33 Bartley 2007.
Table 3 Two additional explanations for the emergence of transnational
private regulation
Market-based approach Political-institutional approach
Key actors Firms Governments, NGOs, social move-
ment organisations, companies
Driving factors Collective action problems roo-
ted in dilemmas of reputation,
information and competition
Political conflicts about regulating
global capitalism
Contextual fac-
tors
Pressures and spotlights on com-
panies and market conditions
Neoliberal projects and institutional-
ised rules about free trade
Mechanism of
institutional
emergence
Cooperation for collective bene-
fits
Conflicts and bargaining
Metaphor for
new institutions
Solutions Settlements
Theoretical back-
ground
Institutional economics and
rational choice theory
Historical institutionalism, some var-
iants of organisational neo-institution-
alism, rational choice theory
Source: Bartley 2007
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supermarkets, farmers, consumer organisations and other affected groups about
the best way of regulating food safety in transnational supply chains.
The following section examines the emergence of GlobalGAP. GlobalGAP is a rele-
vant case for studying the emergence of transnational supermarket standards
because it can be considered as one of the most popular standards, which is used
by many farmers throughout the world to guarantee food safety.
The Emergence of GlobalGAP
The development of the GlobalGAP standard (which was called EurepGAP until
2007) started in 1996. In that year, twelve European supermarkets and retailers
– Tesco, Safeways, Sainsbury’s, GB Supermarkets, Continent, Delhaize, ICA Hand-
larna, KF, Albert Heijn, MARTINAVARRO, APO and Promodores 34 – founded the
Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (Eurep). Their aim was to take first steps
towards the harmonisation of their own standards and develop one European
standard for Good Agricultural Practices.35
According to Van der Grijp et al., the basic idea of establishing Eurep came from
British supermarkets which had three main reasons for developing EurepGAP.36
First, British supermarkets took the lead in the Eurep initiative because they wan-
ted to impose the same standards on overseas suppliers as they already did on
national suppliers.
Secondly, the supermarkets were responding mainly to two, newly developed
food regulations which imposed new obligations on British supermarkets. The UK
Food Safety Act of 1990 included new obligations on British supermarkets and
other food companies to take responsibility in guaranteeing food safety in supply
chains. The EU’s programme of harmonisation of maximum levels for pesticide
residues in foodstuffs sold in the EU restricted the range of pesticides that were
acceptable and lowered residue levels for other pesticides.37 By working together
on developing (costly) measures to fulfil their new obligations, no single super-
market was placed at a market disadvantage.
Thirdly, British supermarkets were under particular pressure to take collective
action because of the government’s policy to publish the results of the govern-
ment’s residue monitoring programme annually, including the names of the
supermarkets that sell products that exceed the permitted MRLs.38 As the larger
British supermarkets worked together, none of them was individually penalised
for taking efforts to improve the industry’s reputation.
Stricter regulations on product liability were also one of the motives for the other
supermarkets that set up Eurep, but it was not one of their main ones. This is
probably due to the differences between the liability laws in the European Union
34 Healy & Gunningham 2003.
35 http://www.ehi.org/en/about-us/history.html, 22-11-2010.
36 Van der Grijp et al. 2005.
37 Chan & King 2000; Humphrey 2008; Van der Grijp et al. 2005.
38 Chan & King 2000.
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and in the United Kingdom at that time. In 1996, supermarkets in continental
Europe were affected by the European Directive for product liability, Directive
85/374/EEC. This Directive is based on the principle that producers,39 including
supermarkets, are liable for damage caused by a defect in their product, regardless
of whether or not the damage is their fault.
An important difference from the UK Food Safety Act, however, concerns the
party who has to prove that the damage was caused by the defective product.40
The Directive states that in such a case ‘the injured person shall be required to
prove the damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and
damage’. The Food Safety Act, on the other hand, states that ‘the burden of proof
lies with the person or company accused; they need to persuade the court that
they exercised due diligence on the balance of probabilities.’ Due to this differ-
ence, the fear of being held liable for damages and injuries was probably a more
important reason for British supermarkets to develop a single, common standard
than it was for supermarkets on the continent. Some supermarkets on the conti-
nent considered the liability issue a normal part of any business activity and not
an excessive constraint on the food sector.41
Supermarkets in continental Europe claim to have had two main reasons for
developing EurepGAP: building (or rebuilding) their reputations, which was also
important for British supermarkets, and reducing risks and costs.42 Until
recently, food safety was not an important issue for many supermarkets in
Europe. This changed in the 1990s when several food safety incidents occurred.
Food scandals created a feeling of fear among many consumers, leading them to
question the safety and quality of food.43 Supermarkets considered food safety
incidents, and the media coverage following those incidents, as risks that could
damage their reputation and their future sales and earnings.44
Before 1996, European supermarkets responded to emerging incidents by creat-
ing firm-specific protocols to ensure the safety of food. The twelve supermarkets
and retailers that set up Eurep realised they had a common interest in guarantee-
ing the safety and quality of food products: if consumers lose confidence in meat
(BSE, hormones) or eggs (salmonella), this affects all supermarkets. This shared
interest motivated them to start working together on a common standard for
food safety. The advantage of a common standard applied by all supermarkets
was maximum pressure on suppliers to comply with the standard, leaving super-
39 According to Article 3 of the Directive, a producer is: ‘the manufacturer of a finished product, the
producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part and any person who, by
putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents himself as
its producer. Without prejudice to the liability of the producer, any person who imports into the
Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any form of distribution in the course of his busi-
ness shall be deemed to be a producer within the meaning of this Directive and shall be responsi-
ble as a producer.’
40 In both regulations, a product is defective when it does not provide the safety that a person may
expect.
41 Fulponi 2006.
42 Fulponi 2006, Havinga 2006.
43 FAO 2006.
44 Fulponi 2006.
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markets the choice to source from as many certified suppliers as possible.45 More-
over, supermarkets were provided with information about how their products
were produced. They needed this information to reassure their consumers that
their food was safe.
A second reason for supermarkets to develop EurepGAP was cost reduction.
Before EurepGAP, each supermarket had to formulate its own standard for the
quality and safety of food. Formulating a standard generates two types of costs:
costs of writing or rewriting the standard, which requires knowledge, experience
and time; and costs of monitoring compliance and enforcement, which requires
company visits and capable inspectors. By developing a standard together, super-
markets could share the costs and each supermarket no longer had to formulate
its own standard. Supermarkets also wanted to reduce their inspection costs, so
they decided that these costs in the EurepGAP standard should be borne by the
farmers. As EurepGAP had to improve food safety, supermarkets expected fewer
recalls and consequently lower costs. The wish of these supermarkets to reduce
costs may also have been influenced by the emergence of discount supermarkets
in the 1990s. Supermarkets in the Netherlands, for example, had to reduce costs
in order to be able to compete with cheap supermarkets like Aldi and Lidl.
By building (and rebuilding) their reputations and reducing risks and costs, super-
markets ultimately aimed to gain more control over the way farmers in their sup-
ply chains produced their food products. They were frustrated that they suffered
for failures that, in their eyes, had been caused by other companies in the supply
chain. This can be concluded from the following statement by the chairman of the
Dutch supermarket association CBL46 in a Dutch news article in 2001:
Being the final link in the supply chain, which has direct contact with con-
sumers, and the first to be addressed in case of unsafe food, supermarkets are
sick of suffering for food safety failures caused by others in the supply
chain.47
These words go to show the frustration of Dutch supermarkets and their willing-
ness to take action to change this situation. Apparently supermarkets had good
hopes that defining and imposing a food safety standard together would enable
them to prevent or reduce the negative effects of food safety failures.
Evolution of GlobalGAP in Course of Time
The twelve supermarkets and retailers first got to work on harmonising the
requirements for their suppliers of fresh fruit and vegetables. According to Healy
and Gunningham:
45 Havinga 2003, 2006.
46 Centraal Bureau Levensmiddelenhandel.
47 Het Financieele Dagblad 15 maart 2001.
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In November 1997, members agreed on the first draft protocol for Good Agri-
cultural Practice (GAP), which represented the first step towards integrated
production, and a harmonisation of production standards. In August 1999,
the first official version of the EurepGAP Protocol was subject to consultation
with growers, produce marketing organisations, verification bodies, agro-
chemical companies, farmers’ organisations and scientific institutions.48
After trials in 2000, the EurepGAP standard was officially introduced in 2001.
The standard set out a framework for Good Agricultural Practice on farms and
defined the minimal requirements acceptable to the leading supermarkets in
Europe.49 It contained 254 requirements covering food safety (e.g., chemical use
and traceability), environmental protection (e.g., waste and pollution manage-
ment) and worker welfare (e.g., personal hygiene and safety). The requirements
were divided into ‘major musts’, for which 100% compliance is compulsory,
‘minor musts’, for which 95% is compulsory and ‘recommendations’, which are
inspected, but compliance is not a prerequisite for the granting of the EurepGAP
certificate.
In the introduction of the standard’s document, Eurep recognised the efforts
already made to minimise adverse impacts on the environment and encouraged
further work to improve growers’ capability in this area. Eurep stressed that all
organisations in the supply chain should accept their share of the tasks and
responsibilities to ensure that EurepGAP is implemented. The tasks and responsi-
bility of growers were to demonstrate their commitment to maintaining con-
sumer confidence in food quality and safety; minimising detrimental impact on
the environment; reducing the use of agrochemicals; improving the efficient use
of natural resources; and ensuring a responsible attitude to worker health and
safety.50 Growers who complied with the requirements and were inspected by an
independent certification body approved by Eurep were eligible for the EurepGAP
certificate. The first certificate was issued in October 2001.
Membership
Since 1996, both Eurep and EurepGAP have changed considerably.51 The mem-
bership of Eurep has changed in two ways.52 First, the number of supermarkets
and their countries of origin have increased. Supermarkets from sixteen different
countries in Europe, North America, Asia and Africa have joined the organisation.
The total number of retailers has grown from twelve in 1996 to 46 in November
2010. Most of them still come from North European countries, such as Germany
(12), the United Kingdom (7) and the Netherlands (5).
The second important change has been the opening up of membership to retailer
suppliers. As members, suppliers are allowed to participate in standard setting
48 Healy & Gunningham 2003.
49 EurepGAP Protocol for fresh Fruit and Vegetables. Version September 2001.
50 EurepGAP Protocol for fresh Fruit and Vegetables. Version September 2001.
51 Humphrey 2008.
52 Humphrey 2008; Van der Kloet & Havinga 2008.
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and decision-making. Retailers and suppliers are equally represented in the
organisation’s sector committees and the board consists of an equal number of
supplier and retailer representatives.53 Sector committees are responsible for
technical decision-making for the sector in which they operate. They are suppor-
ted and controlled by a secretariat. Final decisions are made by the board. In
recent years, the number of companies with a supplier membership has grown
well, from 109 in April 2007 to 150 in May 2009 and 168 in November 2010.54
These companies are mainly food processors, importers, exporters, and their
associations. Most of them come from European countries. In May 2009, for
example, more than two-thirds (109) were companies from European countries.
The others came from South America (15), North America (8), Africa (8), Asia (4),
the Middle East (3) and New Zealand (3).55
A closer look at the board and sector committees teaches us that while retailers
and suppliers have equal representation, there are asymmetries in membership.56
Suppliers from developing countries are unequally represented. The board only
has one member from a developing country, while the three sector committees
(Crops, Livestock and Aquaculture) have only seven members who are not from
Europe, the United Sates or New Zealand. All three sector committees are chaired
by retailers. Obviously, there are unequal relationships between retailers and sup-
pliers, and between developed countries and developing countries. Small-scale
suppliers (farmers) from developing countries are represented in the sector com-
mittees by the Africa Observer. This smallholders’ ambassador, who has been
appointed by GlobalGAP, is invited to participate in meetings but is not given vot-
ing rights. Meidinger has observed that transnational regimes, such as Global-
GAP, tend to face northwards and have only haltingly and partially incorporated
the voices and interests of developing country suppliers and publics.57 This sup-
ports the statement by Konefal et al. that suppliers in developing countries have
become standard takers while retailers in industrialised countries have become
standard setters.58
Global Aspirations
Throughout the years, GlobalGAP has become an organisation with global aspira-
tions. On the website it describes itself as ‘a private sector body that sets volun-
tary standards for the certification of agricultural products around the globe. The
aim is to establish one standard for Good Agricultural Practice with different
53 The standard has a third type of membership, which is open to companies from the input and
service side of agriculture, such as companies from the crop protection industry and certification
bodies. These so-called associate members give advice, but are not directly involved in the stan-
dard setting and decision-making process. In May 2009, there were 104 associate members
(Europe: 69, South America: 9, Asia: 7, North America: 7, Africa: 5, Central America: 3, Oceania:
3, Middle East: 1).
54 Humphrey 2008 and GlobalGAP website: http://www2.globalgap.org/members.html?memtype
=associate, May 2009 and November 2010.
55 http://www2.globalgap.org, 11-05-2009.
56 Fuchs et al. 2011; Konefal et al. 2004; Van der Kloet & Havinga 2008.
57 Meidinger 2009.
58 Konefal et al. 2004.
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product applications capable of fitting to the whole of global agriculture’.59 The
geographical diffusion of the members is only one part of this process. GlobalGAP
exports its standard by having the standard benchmarked against SQF 1000 (Safe
Quality Food), another international food safety standard, and by establishing
partnerships with other industry organisations such as the Global Food Safety
Initiative and with private organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund
(WWF).60 At the same time, GlobalGAP has adopted a policy that encourages the
benchmarking of national and regional farm standards against the GlobalGAP
standard. This offers the possibility to adapt GlobalGAP to national circumstan-
ces. Standards that have completed the benchmarking process are acknowledged
as GlobalGAP equivalent. By November 2010, fifteen national standards had been
fully benchmarked against GlobalGAP, including New Zealand GAP, ChileGAP
and MexicoGAP.61
Guidance in Implementation
Another part of GlobalGAP’s global aspirations is to guide suppliers in their
implementation of the standard. GlobalGAP offers national members the option
to establish national technical working groups, whose role it is to develop
national interpretation guidelines and address specific local adaptation and
implementation challenges.62 These guidelines tell suppliers how the require-
ments should be interpreted and implemented in their specific context. In
November 2010, 35 national working groups had been established in twelve
European countries and twenty countries outside Europe.
Further indications of EurepGAP’s global aspirations include the 108 countries
with certified farmers and the meetings and presentations held with the EU Com-
mission, WTO and several national governments and development agencies
about how private voluntary standards relate to national and international law.
In response to these changes in membership and objectives, EurepGAP re-bran-
ded the name of the organisation and standard as GlobalGAP. This change was
announced at the 8th global conference in Bangkok in September 2007 and came
into force as of 1 January 2008.
More Agricultural Products Covered
The GlobalGAP standard has also changed in course of time. The range of prod-
ucts covered by the standard has expanded. While GlobalGAP initially only
applied to fruit and vegetables, it now also covers meat products and fish from
aquaculture, as well as plant propagation material and animal feed. The Global-
GAP standard currently consists of four standards: GlobalGAP Integrated Farm
Assurance Standard (fruit and vegetables), GlobalGAP Compound Feed Manufac-
59 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=2, 29-11-2010.
60 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=44&idart=756, 29-11-2010 and Global-
GAP Annual Report 2010.
61 http://www2.globalgap.org/full_app_stand.html, 29-11-2010.
62 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/upload/Resources/Publications/FAQs/080229-FAQ-NTWG.pdf,
29-11-2010.
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turers Standard (animal feed), GlobalGAP Plant Propagation Material Standard
and GlobalGAP Risk Assessment on Social Practice (worker welfare).
New Versions
These standards are constantly improved and revised to ensure continued rele-
vance and effectiveness.63 Since its introduction in 2001, three new versions of
GlobalGAP have been developed. The second version was introduced in 2004, the
third in 2007. Version four was introduced in March 2011.
The changes in the standard are also reflected in the number and status of the
requirements in each version. Version 1, for example, counted a total of 254
requirements, while version 2 counted ‘only’ 210 requirements. This second stan-
dard, however, included more major musts and some issues had gained in impor-
tance, including pesticide residues, hygiene during harvesting and produce han-
dling.64
Impact
The development and evolution of GlobalGAP has placed food safety (higher) on
the agenda of more than 100,000 farmers in many countries. This has undoubt-
edly resulted in some improvements in the safety of production processes on
farms.
At the same time, the emergence and evolution of GlobalGAP may also have
reproduced and magnified power inequalities in global supply chains, especially
between supermarkets and their suppliers. First, GlobalGAP includes require-
ments that apply to farmers and growers, not to supermarkets. This makes super-
markets standard setters and farmers standard takers.
Secondly, many supermarkets in Europe as well as exporters, importers and
national food traders demand a GlobalGAP certificate from their suppliers. This
has turned GlobalGAP from a voluntary standard to a commercially mandatory
standard, leaving farmers with hardly any other option than to apply for certifica-
tion. It is suggested that this hinders or denies access to export markets for small-
scale farmers in developing countries. Such farmers are often faced with more dif-
ficulties when implementing the standard than large-scale farmers or farmers in
developed countries. In order to compensate for this distributional effect, Global-
GAP has introduced a regulation that allows farmers to choose group certifica-
tion. In this way, farmers can reduce certification costs and requirements neces-
sary for GlobalGAP can be centralised, such as pesticide control and building
toilets and other facilities.
Thirdly, whereas suppliers do indeed participate in decision-making processes,
they are largely from developed countries, with far less representation from
developing countries.
63 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/upload/The_Standard/Standards-Development/GLOBALGAP_
Standard_setting_procedure_V1_Aug08.pdf, 29-10-2010.
64 Van der Grijp et al. 2005.
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Conclusion
This article has explored the emergence and evolution of transnational supermar-
ket standards by analyzing the development of GlobalGAP, one of the most com-
monly implemented transnational supermarket standards on farms throughout
the world. In the literature, the emergence of transnational regulation is often
attributed to one or two factors that were important for the development at one
particular moment in time. In this article it is argued that the emergence of trans-
national regulations is best understood when it is studied as a process in time.
The factors explaining the emergence of GlobalGAP correspond with some of the
factors found in the literature. In short, GlobalGAP has emerged because super-
markets wanted to gain more control in their supply chains and because they
wanted to rebuild their reputation, reduce risks and costs, inspire consumer con-
fidence in the safety of food products and generate credible information about
product specifications. These explanations correspond with Bartley’s market-
based approach of explaining transnational private regulation (regulations as sol-
utions to collective action problems) and with the reasons suggested by Hey-
vaert65 (emergence due to ambition and strategic interests of regulators) and
Meidinger66 (new regulation in response to public scares).
When analyzing the different factors that have contributed to the emergence of
GlobalGAP together, a development process can be identified that may be helpful
in analyzing the emergence of other transnational private standards. This process
has four main characteristics. First, transnational supermarket standards are
likely to emerge in response to commotions and concerns among large numbers
of people within and beyond nation-states related to real or perceived safety or
health risks. The emergence of EurepGAP can be seen as a response to a number
of global food safety incidents during the 1990s which contributed to a decline in
consumer confidence in the safety and quality of food.67
Second, for transnational supermarket standards to emerge there must be what
Bartley calls ‘pressuring actors’ who publicly demand measures to reduce or pre-
vent the risks concerned.68 By doing so, these actors create a situation that
demands the emergence of transnational regulation. British and continental
supermarkets reacted, for example, to stricter government regulations.
Third, someone has to be held responsible for taking corrective measures. This is
not necessarily the one who caused the incident. The GlobalGAP case demon-
strates that supermarkets were pressured by national governments and NGOs to
take measures against food safety incidents, which, according to supermarkets,
had been caused by actors in other parts of the supply chain.
A fourth and final characteristic is that those who are held responsible for taking
action are encouraged to develop new regulations, and are capable of doing so.
These ‘institutional’ actors may be encouraged if they experience disadvantages of
65 Heyvaert 2010.
66 Meidinger 2009.
67 FAO 2006.
68 Bartley 2007.
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being held responsible or see advantages in developing regulations. The super-
markets that developed EurepGAP were triggered by both: they experienced repu-
tation damage and increased costs, but they also saw a possibility to gain more
control over their supply chains.
This article provides a preliminary insight into the development of one transna-
tional supermarket standard. In order to gain a more complete and reliable
picture, more research is required, for example, on the emergence of other trans-
national supermarket standards like BRC and Tesco Nature’s Choice, or transna-
tional standards in other food sectors and non-food sectors. An interesting
comparison would be between transnational standards developed by firms and
transnational standards developed by NGOs or a combination of firms and
NGOs.
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